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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department 
of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Panel 6. Considerations in Acquiring Open 
Architecture Software Systems 
Wednesday, May 16, 2012  
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Lynne Spruill, APEO Engineering Support 
Addressing Challenges in the Acquisition of Secure Software Systems With 
Open Architectures 
Walt Scacchi and Thomas Alspaugh 
University California, Irvine 
Certifying Tools for Test Reduction in Open Architecture 
Valdis Berzins, Naval Postgraduate School 
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joined the Sea Snakes of HSL-33, flying the SH-2F Sea Sprite until December 1989. He deployed in 
the USS Kirk (FF1067), the USS Knox (FF 1052), the USS Francis Hammond (FF1067), and the USS 
Sterrett (CG 31), including service in Operation Earnest Will. 
He attended the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, from 1990 until 1992, earning a 
Master of Science (with distinction) in operations research. He taught in the U.S. Naval Academy 
Mathematics Department from May 1992 until May 1995 and served as the Fifth Company Officer 
from August 1993 until May 1995. He also served as an advanced seamanship and navigation 
instructor and was designated a craftmaster/yard patrol craft officer-in-charge afloat. 
Captain Beel completed Fleet Replacement Pilot training with HSL-41 in February 1996 and 
joined the Battle Cats of HSL-43, flying the SH-60B Sea Hawk until 1998. He deployed in the USS 
Princeton (CG 59). 
From June 1998 until August 1999, Captain Beel served as the training and education program 
analyst in the Assessment Division (N81), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He served in a 
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Networks Program Office from June 2008 to August 2010. 
Captain Beel is a member of the Defense Acquisition Corps and is Level III certified in Program 
Management, Life Cycle Logistics and Production, and Quality and Manufacturing. He is a certified 
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Lean Six Sigma Black Belt. He led a continuous process improvement project that was awarded a 
California Council of Excellence California Team Excellence bronze award and was selected to 
compete for the American Society of Quality’s International Team Excellence Award at the 2011 
World Conference on Quality and Improvement. 
Captain Beel’s awards include the Meritorious Service Medal (three awards), Air Medal (individual 
award), Navy Commendation Medal (five awards), Navy Achievement Medal, and various unit, 
campaign, and service awards. He has also received the Sikorsky “Winged-S” Lifesaving Rescue 
Award. 
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Abstract 
We seek to articulate and address a number of emerging challenges in continuously assuring 
the security of open architecture (OA) software systems throughout the system acquisition 
life-cycle. It is now clear that future system must resist coordinated international attacks on 
vulnerable software-intensive systems that are of high value, and control complex systems. 
But current approaches to system security are most often piecemeal with little or no support 
for guiding what system security requirements must address across different system-
processing elements and data levels, and how those can be manifest during the design, 
building, and deployment of OA software systems. We present a framework that organizes 
OA system security elements and mechanisms in forms that can be aligned with different 
stages of acquisition spanning system design, building, and run-time deployment, as well as 
system evolution. We provide a case study to show our scheme and how it can be applied to 
common enterprise systems. 
Introduction 
We seek to research, develop, and refine new concepts, techniques, and tools for 
continuously assuring the security of large-scale, open architecture (OA) software systems composed 
from software components that include proprietary/closed source software (CSS) and open source 
software (OSS). Federal government acquisition policy, as well as many leading enterprise IT 
centers, now encourage the use of CSS and OSS, and thus OA, in the development, deployment, 
and evolution of complex, software-intensive systems. 
We seek to prototype and demonstrate a new innovative approach and supporting 
technology that can develop new principles for correctness and security properties for OA systems. 
This includes developing basic principles to determine the security and performance properties of 
software systems, the conditions under which these properties hold, and the methods used to prove 
these properties of interest for systems. Of particular interest are networked OA software systems 
that are adapted or that evolve to dynamic conditions and threats during their development, 
deployment, and usage, including those that may rely on new technologies like OA mobile devices 
(Smalley, 2012; “Security Technical Information Guide,” n.d.) or other IT systems relying on open 
source technologies (Department of Defense [DoD], 2010; Garcia, 2010; Gizzi, 2011; Navy, 2010). In 
particular, such study may be of value to securing new cyber warfare technologies (DoD, 2011; 
Scacchi, Brown, & Nies, 2011). Our efforts may also lead to fundamental advancements for secure 
information sharing between information producers and consumers in order to realize more secure 
information management, sharing, and interaction. 
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Challenges of Securing Systems with Open Architectures 
Coordinated international attacks on vulnerable software-intensive systems that are 
of high value and on control complex systems are becoming ever more apparent. As the 
StuxNet case demonstrates, security threats to software systems are multi-valent, multi-
modal, and distributed across independently developed software system components 
(Stuxnet, 2011). Similarly, it is now clear that physically isolated/confined systems are 
vulnerable to external security attacks via portable storage devices like USB drives, modified 
end-user devices (e.g., keyboards, mice; “Attack of the Computer Mouse,” 2011), and social 
engineering techniques (Sawyers, 2011). This requires new security measures and policies 
necessary to defend such systems through new threat prevention and detection methods, 
as well as appropriate response mechanisms. Thus, what makes a system or system 
architecture secure changes over time, as new threats emerge and as systems evolve to 
meet new functional requirements. Consequently, there is need for an approach to 
continuously assure the security of complex, evolving OA systems in ways that are practical 
and scalable yet robust, tractable, and adaptable. 
However, the best practices for developing OA systems whose components may be 
subject to differing security requirements (e.g., security rights and obligations) are unclear. 
Such practices are yet to be identified. This puts IT centers, system integrators, and service 
providers at a disadvantage when seeking to develop new software-intensive systems 
whose costs may be lower due to the integration of mature OSS components that are 
interfaced to pre-existing or new CSS components. OA systems thus present new 
challenges for assuring software system security. 
Software systems security mechanisms for enabling security requirements or policies 
are often employed on an ad hoc basis, because there are not convenient or interactive 
tools or formal techniques for specifying the security requirements of an OA system or its 
components. Instead, what is available are disjoint mechanisms for implementing individual 
system security features (Loscocco et al., 1998; Spencer et al., 1999), such as 
 mandatory access control lists and firewalls; 
 multi-level security; 
 authentication (including certificate authority and passwords); 
 cryptographic support (including public key certificates); 
 encapsulation (including virtualization and hidden versus public APIs), hardware 
confinement (memory, storage, and external device [port] isolation; Sun, Wang, 
Zhang, & Stavrou, 2012), and type enforcement capabilities; 
 secure programming practices (including secure coding standards, data type, 
and value range checking; Seacord, 2008); 
 data content or control signal flow logging/auditing; 
 honey-pots and traps; 
 security technical information guides for configuring the security parameters for 
applications (“Security Technical,” 2011) and operating systems (Smalley, 2012); 
and 
 functionally equivalent but diverse multi-variant software executables (Franz, 
2010; Salamat, Jackson, Wagner, Wimmer, & Franz, 2011). 
But there is a gap between these mechanisms and any concept of a comprehensive 
security policy, whether for a system or for any of its components, and no obvious way to 
integrate and evaluate them as a group. Similarly, it is unclear what relationships arise or 
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are in place among these different security mechanisms. Further, what guidance is needed 
regarding which security mechanism to use where, when, why, and how, and how is their 
usage updated or configured as extant system security policy evolves? The mechanisms 
are also mostly software implementation choices rather than system architectural choices; 
no system-specific framework (like an architecture) exists in which they can be pulled 
together in patterns that can be designed to meet specific security policies and goals. But in 
an OA system, it may be unclear or unlikely that system integrators will find mature OSS or 
CSS components that supply all of the system security features that the integrator or the 
customer requires on a timely, cost-effective basis. 
Next, OA systems evolve through more pathways than traditional systems: 
 individual components evolve through update revisions (e.g., security patches) 
made by the component’s developers; 
 individual components are updated with new, functionally enhanced versions 
from outside providers; 
 individual components are replaced by different components from other sources; 
 component interfaces evolve, either due to the system developers or outside 
sources; 
 system architecture and configuration evolve as the developers adapt them to 
address new functional requirements; 
 system functional and security requirements evolve, either due to the system 
developers, recognized gaps, or outside stakeholders; and 
 system security policies, mechanisms, security components, and system 
configuration parameter settings also change over time. 
These additional evolution paths are tied to the benefits of using OA systems with 
OSS components, but they also present new challenges for security. OA systems are 
continually evolving, and in our view this fact is fundamentally unaddressed by prior work in 
security. 
Beyond these issues, we must consider the following: How should customers specify 
what security system features they want their delivered systems to support? How can the 
history of security failures (vulnerabilities), faults (exploits), possible cyber-warfare attacks 
(threats), and possible responses (updating system configuration with new elements that 
resist new threats, close new vulnerability, and prevent newly discovered exploits) guide the 
evolution of approaches for developing secure OA systems? How can answers to questions 
like these help formulate a technological innovation element of the DoD strategy for 
operating in cyberspace (DoD, 2011)? Questions like this remain unresolved at present. 
Verification of the usage of security mechanisms in software systems is unclear and 
often focused either at the whole system (macro) level, or at the program function or coding 
(micro) level, but generally not at the architectural component and interconnection (meso) 
level, and not for combinations and alternative configurations of CSS and OSS components 
with different security histories. We believe that there is a new or under-explored opportunity 
to address security requirements at the architectural level. 
As such, we see the following basic challenges in assuring OA system security: 
 how to verify the security of OA system designs throughout system development, 
deployment, and post-deployment support; and 
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 how to validate the effectiveness of OA system security measures and feed 
evolving knowledge of vulnerabilities and exploits back into the ongoing 
development (continuous evolution) stream for existing and planned systems in 
an operational, testable form that system designers can use and program 
managers can assess. 
Similarly, we see the following basic challenges in assuring security of OA software 
systems: 
 how best to develop complex OA systems whose OSS or CSS system 
components may originally come from trusted sources but in which these 
components, the architectural configuration, and security requirements are 
subject to multiple sources of adaptation and evolution; 
 how to go beyond “many eyes” (a large number of skilled reviewers) to establish 
a scalable basis for automated or semi-automated verification of software system 
security properties as the system continually evolves; 
 how best to achieve continuous software system security assurance as a system 
is adapted and evolved to address new security requirements and technology 
progress; 
 how best to protect OA systems through biologically inspired natural defenses 
that provide adaptive and resilient mechanisms, including agile response, 
isolation, and fail-soft recovery to immediate attacks, as well as adaptation via 
dynamic reconfiguration, multi-version mechanisms, (artificial) ecological 
diversity responses to sustained vulnerabilities or threats (Shrobe, 2011); and 
 how to create reference models and security policy requirements that articulate 
security scenarios appropriate for oversight during system acquisition, as well as 
during system design, implementation, deployment, and beyond. 
Securing Software Systems 
The key ideas in our approach to develop and demonstrate a new solution to the 
challenges is to specify verifiable security requirements of OA systems using formalized 
“security licenses” (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2011) and to use an explicit, evolvable software 
architecture to mediate and carry the paths of interactions among them. Security licenses 
must specify the security requirements and access/update rights and obligations within an 
OA system, its CSS and OSS components, and their interconnections (e.g., APIs, 
databases, shared files, and communication protocols) that defend against threats and 
enable appropriate responses to attacks or suspicious/anomalous system behaviors. 
Subsequently, the goal of our approach is to articulate and refine the ways and means for 
expressing and verifying that the security requirements of OA system components match up 
appropriately and together support the security requirements of the entire OA system at 
architectural design-time while enabling the automated verification of system 
builds/compositions and deployable, as well as of executable run-time versions of the 
system. 
Software licenses represent a collection of rights and obligations for what can or 
cannot be done with a licensed software component. Licenses can thus denote both 
functional and non-functional requirements that apply to software systems or system 
components during their development and deployment. But rights and obligations are not 
limited to concerns or constraints applicable only to software as IP. Instead, they can be 
written in ways that stipulate functional or non-functional requirements of different kinds. 
Consider, for example, that desired or necessary software system security properties can 
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also be expressed as rights and obligations addressing system confidentiality, integrity, 
accountability, system availability, and assurance. This kind of approach provides new 
principles of correctness for software IP requirements (Breaux & Anton, 2005, 2008). 
Traditionally, developing robust specifications for non-functional software system 
security properties in natural language often produces specifications that are ambiguous, 
misleading, inconsistent across system components, and lacking sufficient details (Yau & 
Chen, 2006). Using a semantic model and logic to formally specify the rights and obligations 
required for a software system or component to be secure (Breaux & Anton, 2005, 2008; 
Yau & Chen, 2006) means that it may be possible to develop both a “security architecture” 
notation and model specification that associates given security rights and obligations across 
a software system, or system of systems. Similarly, it suggests the possibility of developing 
computational tools or interactive architecture development environments that can be used 
to specify, model, and analyze a software system’s security architecture at different times in 
its development—design-time, build-time, and run-time. We have already demonstrated how 
such an approach can work when limiting attention to IP rights and obligations. 
The approach we have been developing for the past few years for modeling and 
analyzing software system IP license architectures for OA systems (Alspaugh, Asuncion, & 
Scacchi, 2009; Alspaugh, Scacchi, & Asuncion, 2010; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008) may 
therefore be extendable to also address OA systems with heterogeneous software security 
license rights and obligations (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2011). Furthermore, the idea of common 
or reusable software security licenses may be analogous to the reusable security 
requirements templates Firesmith (2004) proposed at the Software Engineering Institute. 
Such security requirement templates may simplify and guide the efforts of customers (or 
contracting officers) to more readily specify workable requirements that can be readily 
verified through system development, deployment, and post-deployment support. 
Security licenses can be specified, modeled, and analyzed continuously from initial 
system architectural design through post-deployment support and system evolution, with 
key points for security license analysis occurring at design-time, build/linking-time, and 
deployment/run-time. Such security licenses can be stated both (a) informally, using 
restricted natural language for human readability, authorship, and description of non-
functional security requirements; as well as (b) formally, specifying functional security 
requirements in a computer processable form using a logic-based scheme and modeling 
notation, with automated production of (a) from (b) and automated architecture-mediated 
inferences using (b). Analysis of a system/s security requirements can therefore be 
integrated into the software architecture tool used to express and evolve the architecture so 
that the analysis evolves automatically in parallel with the architecture. 
In general terms, a security license is analogous to a software copyright license such 
as a general public license (GPL; GNU, 2007). Software licenses consist of intellectual 
property (IP) rights granted by the license, and corresponding license obligations needed to 
obtain the rights. Our innovation is to similarly specify the security obligations and rights of 
OA system components using elements found in known security capabilities, which we can 
then model, analyze, and support throughout the system’s development and evolution, and 
use to guide system design and instantiation. Our initial investigation of security licenses 
(Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2011) has identified rights and obligations, such as 
 the obligation for a user to verify his/her authority to see compartment T by 
password or other specified authentication process; 
 the obligation for a specific component to have been vetted for the capability to 
read and update data in compartment T; 
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 the obligation for all components connected to specified component C to grant it 
the capability to read and update data in compartment T; 
 the obligation to reconfigure a system in response to detected threats when given 
the right to select and include different component versions or executable 
component variants; 
 the right to read and update data in compartment T using the licensed 
component; 
 the right to replace specified component C with some other component; 
 the right to add or update specified component D in a specified configuration; 
 the right to add, update, or remove a security mechanism; and 
 the right to update security license L. 
Further, formally specified OA security licenses are verifiable, as well as grounded in 
functional and testable system security capabilities. 
The security reasoning chains among the security licenses are mediated by the 
system architecture and evolve automatically with it, much like they can for IP licenses 
(Alspaugh et al., 2009; Alspaugh et al., 2011; Alspaugh et al., 2010). Each kind of security 
license details how its obligations are propagated architecturally to other system 
components. The results of this propagation, coupled with automated identification of gaps, 
conflicts, and subsumptions, are communicated to analysts as architecturally organized 
arguments supporting the existence of the identified issues. The arguments provide context-
appropriate guidance in terms of the system architecture and the security licenses of the 
components involved for resolution of security problems through the evolution of the system 
design. 
Our approach neither assumes nor proves that individual elements of an OA system 
are secure but instead seeks to determine what security rights and obligations are in effect 
at any time for the overall system architecture as a function of the security rights and 
obligations of its components. This means that it is possible to configure a secure OA 
system whose components may be insecure, or not equally secure. Our approach also 
supports determination of where or how OA system security rights or obligations may be in 
conflict, mismatch, or subsume one another as individual system components or connectors 
are adapted to evolve over time. As an organization’s security policies (i.e., their security 
requirements) evolve and adapt, the OA system’s security rights and obligations are evolved 
to match and satisfy them, as long as all security requirements can be expressed through 
description logic relationships among them. 
Security rights and obligations are characterized in terms of enterprise security 
policies and goals; within that closed world, our approach enables specification of the 
security properties that an open system architecture must match or satisfy. These security 
requirements also direct acquisition program managers and architecture analysts attention 
to problem areas with greatest impact on system security. Where our approach identifies a 
conflict or mismatch, it indicates an actual, open-world weakness in the security of the OA 
system under analysis. The chain of reasoning is architecture-mediated, with its units 
defined piecewise in each component's security license and evolving continuously as the 
system architecture, configuration, and security requirements evolve. As new kinds or types 
of vulnerability, threats, or exploits emerge, as well as new categories of effective responses 
and emerging alternative security mechanisms, we seek to elaborate and demonstrate that 
this approach can continuously accommodate the specification and analysis of changing 
security requirements. 
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Product Lines: Alternatives, Versions, and Variants of OA Elements 
In producing a secure OA system in a software product line, there are several levels 
of variation available for producing artificial diversity among equivalent instances and for 
selecting and evolving in the face of threats. 
At the highest level of granularity, a system developer or integrator can choose 
among alternative producers of similar components, services, and platforms (Sun et al., 
2012). For example, we can find functionally similar alternatives from software (component) 
producers of Web browsers like Mozilla (Firefox, Camino, Sea Monkey) versus Google 
(Chrome) versus Microsoft (Internet Explorer), versus others. Similarly, for word processors, 
we find alternatives including Microsoft (Word) versus abisoft.com (AbiWord) versus Google 
(Google Docs, which is a remote Web service rather than a component), versus others. 
Likewise, for e-mail and calendar applications, we find alternatives like Microsoft Outlook, 
Gnome Evolution, Google Mail, and Google Calendar, among others. For operating 
systems, we find Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Microsoft Windows, Apple OSX, and Google 
Android, among others. Finally, note that some producers produce more than one 
alternative of the same kind of component or service, such as Mozilla’s Web browsers 
(Firefox, Camino, SeaMonkey), so that a choice among those particular components does 
not result in a change of producers. 
Functionally similar components and services may not be exactly interchangeable, 
unless their interfaces are similar or identical. As such, it may be necessary to modify, for 
example, OA system topology or replace connector types, and other architectural measures 
may be necessary to change from one producer to another, depending on the functionality 
needed to satisfy functional requirements. However, in general, the overall functionality 
provided by the system remains substantially the same; but now the diversity among 
alternative system instances is the greatest: not only is the component, service, or platform 
distinct between two instances, but its architectural connections in the system will also be 
distinct, as will be the software development process and organization that produced it; so 
the chances of a common vulnerability are greatly minimized. Subsequently, when 
functionally similar components, connectors, or configurations exist, such that equivalent 
alternatives, versions, or variants may be substituted for one another, then we have a strong 
relationship among these OA system elements that is called a product family 
(Narayanaswamy & Scacchi, 1987; Bosch, 2006) or a product line (Clements & Northrop, 
2001). 
As described previously, a shift from one alternative to another ordinarily requires a 
change in architecture, software connectors, and other measures. Changes between some 
alternatives will also produce a change of producers, while others will not. However, when 
components or connectors provide alternative implementations of the functionality they 
provide, then these are designated as versions. For example, most Linux operating systems 
support multiple file systems for data storage, though developers or integrators select their 
preferred file system for inclusion at either design-time or build-time. Similarly, for 
connectors to remote Web servers, developers or integrators may specify unencrypted (e.g., 
HTTP) or encrypted (e.g., HTTPS) data communication protocols for use in a Web-based 
enterprise system. Next, at the OA system configuration level, selection of alternative 
components or connectors, or of different versions of components or connectors, result in 
different overall system versions that conform to a system product line. Further, recent 
advances in source code compilation now allow for creation of functionally identical variants 
of software components, though each variant has a different run-time image in the 
computer, through code randomization techniques (Franz, 2010; SJWWF11). Last, software 
product lines can be bound to a network of software producers, system integrators, and 
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system users/consumers through a software ecosystem (Bosch, 2009), such that secure 
systems can be realized through composition or configuration at the software ecosystem 
level (SA12). Consequently, we now have a complete and robust basis for specifying OA 
systems that can include components, connectors, or application systems from alternative 
producers, or with different versions or variants included. This is now our basis for moving 
forward to address the challenges of creating secure OA systems through secured software 
product lines. 
Given the basis for software product lines for OA systems, we now address how to 
frame and align software system architectures with software security mechanisms. We use 
the following scheme to address this, as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Different System Security Elements Whose Rights and Obligations 
Depend on Capabilities Supported by Lower Level Elements 
 
System security policies provide the overall context for what kinds of security 
mechanisms or capabilities (e.g., mandatory role-based data access control) that a 
particular systems requires. The requirements must be realized through multiple levels of 
system composition that span a processing space from people to processing platforms, and 
through data/content space that is processed during system usage/operation. 
Aligning system security elements with security mechanisms gives rise to the 
following associations: 
Platform—base technological elements that constitute the computer environment 
that hosts the target system: 
 hardware: specifies hardware confinement constraints needed to securely 
operate the software system configuration, potentially to address memory, 
storage, and external device port isolation (see SecureSwitch [Sun et al., 2012)]). 
Hardware may be configured as an embedded processor, mobile computer (e.g., 
smartphone or tablet), personal computer, multi-processor computation server, or 
multi-server data center; 
 virtual machine: a software layer that can isolate and confine the operating 
system, component applications, or application services from direct control of 
system hardware, network operations, or operating system processes. OSs, 
software systems, components, or connectors can each run within their own 
virtual machine, in alternative configurations, as long as they are completely 
confined at a higher level of system security and do not overlap virtual machine 
boundaries (Spencer et al., 1999; Smalley, 2012); 
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 network: message filtering and access control firewalls for data/control flows that 
move across external hardware system security boundaries; and 
 operating systems: mandatory access control (Loscocco et al., 1998; Spencer et 
al., 1999), capability type enforcement (Smalley, 2012), OS configuration 
parameters (“Security Technical,” n.d.), and run-time audit logs, all currently 
coded and managed by system integrators/administrators.  
Connectors—software mechanisms that implement secure communication 
mechanisms within and across system boundaries. Connectors enable security 
mechanisms providing 
 data cryptography (encryption/decryption) before/after data transfer; 
 component-connector-specific firewalls that can be implemented via (pre-
conditions) constraints on in-bound data flow and plug-in/helper application 
invocation, or on out-bound data flow and external program invocations (post-
conditions); and 
 multi-version connector configurations between components that allow for 
artificial diversity and dynamic reconfiguration potential through functionally 
similar versions. 
Components—software mechanisms that implement application functionality 
required for the targeted system to operate as intended. Components enable security 
mechanisms providing 
 access/usage authentication control obligations (e.g., login with authorized 
identification and password) for which people in what roles (e.g., developer, 
system integrator, system administrator, system user) have the specified set of 
rights to view/update data, data control flow invocations, or external program 
invocations; 
 encapsulate components as services within virtual machines to confine potential 
exploits while mitigating their propagation; 
 alternative versions that increase artificial diversity and enable dynamic 
replacement with functionally similar alternatives; 
 multiple versions that allow for changes in vulnerability space, including 
concurrent versions with replicated input data, but different out data connector 
(routing) configurations; and 
 multiple variants that reduce vulnerability to component version attacks. 
System configuration—the composition and interrelationship of components and 
connectors that together realize the system architecture at design-time, build-time, or 
run-time. System configuration (or composition [Bo06]) enables security by providing 
 the ability to host multiple (one or more) alternative, version, or variant system 
configurations on one or more processors (either single-core [Sun et al., 2012], 
multi-core, multi-blade, or multi-site) that can be dynamically selected in 
response to security policy directives or in response to detected threats; 
 the ability to host concurrently running multiple (one or more) alternative, version, 
or variant system configurations on one or more processors (either multi-core, 
multi-blade, or multi-site) that can be dynamically selected in response to security 
policy directives or in response to detected threats; and 
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 the ability to (formally) specify system configuration as an open architecture at 
design-time, build-time, and deployment run-time, along with automated tools 
that can verify the consistency, completeness, and traceability. 
Developers, system integrators, and users—denote the people authorized and 
trusted to work on or with the configured systems or their elements over time, 
depending on their externally assigned role(s): 
 developers should employ software development environments, tools, or 
processes that reinforce security-safe software coding practices of components 
or connectors they implement as products (Seacord, 2008); 
 developers should produce multiple, unique, executable variants of the 
components or connectors they produce and distribute; 
 system integrators design OA system architecture; 
 system integrators build OA system configurations that select from one or more 
component or connector alternatives, versions, and variants; 
 system integrators deploy one or more run-time system configuration variants 
that can be readily installed and appropriate parameters entered by system 
administrators or end users; 
 system integrators or system administrators, or automated mechanisms under 
their control must be able to monitor and access system execution audit logs, to 
determine if threats or anomalous system behaviors are detected, and to 
dynamically reconfigure system configuration or security parameters in order to 
move the executable system into a more trusted operational state; 
 users must be provided with online identifiers or identification methods that 
enable them to access security controlled systems via one or more alternative 
authentication mechanisms in place. 
In parallel with these processing security spaces are data security spaces: 
User I/O data—data that may exist only as it passes across communication 
channels. Examples are keystrokes and mouse movements communicated from a 
keyboard or mouse to a processor, voice data from microphones and to speakers, 
Wi-Fi packets, and so forth. This data may be discarded or incorporated into 
ephemeral data. 
Ephemeral data—data that exists in memory for a brief time before being either 
discarded or incorporated into persistent data. Examples are Web forms that have 
been filled out but not submitted, and data in various sorts of hardware buffers. 
Persistent data—data that exists for a substantial time on local disks or solid-state 
storage devices, USB memory sticks, DVD-ROM, or server storage.  
Security policies—provide overall guidance and requirements for what security 
mechanisms and regimes are to be designed, implemented, and satisfied during the 
deployment, operation, and evolution of a specified system. Security policies 
 should provide non-functional requirements regarding the membership, structure, 
and behavioral specifications of each of the proceeding categories of security 
elements at minimum, or further specification of security sub-elements within 
each category, as per the security exposure of the system being addressed; 
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o non-functional requirements may only specify rights provided when 
corresponding obligations are fulfilled that cannot be automated or 
verified in lower level security elements; 
o non-functional requirements should be expressible in human-readable 
and computer-processable forms within the system security policy 
license; and 
 must provide functional requirements regarding the membership, structure, and 
behavioral specifications of each of the proceeding categories of security 
elements at minimum, or further specification of security sub-elements within 
each category, as per the security exposure of the system being addressed; 
o functional requirements are those that can be formalized, automated, and 
verified by corresponding automated mechanisms available at lower level 
security elements; 
o functional requirements may only specify rights provided when 
corresponding obligations are fulfilled that must be automated or verified 
in lower level security elements; and 
o functional requirements should be expressible in human-readable and 
computer-processable forms within the system security policy license. 
The case study that follows describes where these different system security 
elements appear in forms that can be available for review by authorized program acquisition 
personnel.  
Case Study of a Secure Product Line for an Enterprise System 
Let us consider what needs to be specified during the acquisition of an enterprise 
system that incorporates common office productivity applications that run on a personal 
computer networked to remote servers. Such a system can include a Web browser, word 
processor, e-mail, and calendaring applications that are configured to operate on a personal 
computer, where the PC’s operating system, Web browser, and other applications need to 
be configured to access remote data/Web content servers. Figure 1 shows part of the 
system ecosystem of software producers and the components they can provide for our 
enterprise system.  
 
Figure 1. A Partial View of a Software Ecosystem of Producers and the Software 
Components for an Enterprise System They Produce 
Figure 2 shows the design-time architecture of such an enterprise system. What 
might a secure product line for a system like this involve, and how might it provide benefits 
and security qualities to be specified for design-time, build-time, and run-time? How can its 
OA and product-line characteristics contribute to security throughout the acquisition system 
life-cycle? 
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Figure 2. A Design-Time Reference Model of an OA System That Accommodates 
Multiple Alternative System Configurations 
We envision an approach in which non-functional requirements, such as security, 
reliability, and evolvability requirements at acquisition time are elaborated at design- and 
build-times by specific functional requirements that explain how and to what degree the non-
functional requirements are going to be satisfied at run-time. Analogous to our previous 
work with IP licensing, we envision that these requirements are structured in the same 
logical forms as IP licenses (with specific rights that are obtained only by fulfilling specific 
obligations) and managed through the architecture by the same approach of calculating 
which obligations are satisfiable, in what way, and as a result what rights are available 
(Alspaugh et al., 2009; Alspaugh et al., 2010; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2011). 
 
Figure 3. A View of an OA Software Ecosystem That Provides Alternative, 
Functionally Similar Components Compatible With the Reference Design-
Time Architecture 
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Figure 3 illustrates a possible OA software ecosystem for this product line. Here, a 
number of possible producers and alternative components have been placed into play, and 
four specific instance architectures (produced in four specific ecosystems) have been 
sketched. With appropriate architectural topologies, and appropriate shim components and 
connectors inserted between the major components, each of these four instance 
architectures can support the same functionality. It is also possible to achieve different 
nonfunctional qualities, including security qualities through the four choices, for example, by 
requiring that OS be an appropriate security-enhanced version of Linux, or by requiring that 
the network protocol connector be HTTPS. 
Within the overall ecosystem of Figure 3, Figure 4 shows one possible instance 
ecosystem involving specific producers (Mozilla, abisource.org, gnome.org, Red Hat) and 
specific alternatives (Firefox, AbiWord, Evolution, Fedora). 
 
Figure 4. A Selection Among Alternative Components That Can Be Included at 
Build-Time to Produce an Integrated System Compatible With the Design-
Time Reference 
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Figure 5. An End-User Run-Time Version of the Selected Alternative Components 
That Fulfills the Design, Where the Red Hat Enterprise Linux Operating 
System (Lower Right Corner) Can Utilize the Security Modules Library, 
SELinux, for Coding and Enforcing Mandatory Access Control on 
Programs/Data and Other Security Capabilities 
Acquisition-time requirements, such as the use of SE Linux and the use of HTTPS, 
could be satisfied by this choice; with an appropriate architecture, the IP licensing 
obligations could also be satisfied. At design-time, the functional requirements would need 
to be satisfied by appropriately specified shims inserted among the principal components, 
and if such shims could be designed then this would be the proof that the acquisition-time 
nonfunctional requirements could also be satisfied. Figure 5 shows a run-time view of this 
instance architecture, resulting from the specific OA ecosystem and instantiating the overall 
ecosystem of Figure 3 and the software product line of which the software system is an 
instance. 
This instance architecture has both a manageable IP license regime that ensures its 
openness and a manageable security regime. For IP, in this architectural instance, all 
component versions can be selected to use permissive licenses (Web browser, Web server) 
or reciprocal GPL licenses (word processor, e-mail, calendar, and operating system), They 
are cleanly separated by dynamic run-time links, which are types of connectors that do not 
transmit IP obligations or rights, though they do allow for control flow integration and data 
flow interoperation.  
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Figure 6. A Second System Configuration Using Alternative but Functionally 
Similar Components 
Figure 6 outlines an alternative system configuration and the instance ecosystem 
that produces it. This instance architecture substitutes services for components in the case 
of Google Docs for the word processing functionality and Google Calendar for the calendar 
functionality. With appropriate shims and changes to the architectural topology this 
combination of major components could also support the system’s functional requirements, 
and because the services are accessed through client-server connections, which block the 
propagation of most license obligations, there are a number of ways to satisfy the IP 
constraints imposed by the component and service licenses. 
This alternative configuration also highlights possible acquisition-time concerns and 
the nonfunctional requirements and security license issues that follow from them. For 
example, a remote service, such as Google Docs, provides benefits and imposes costs with 
respect to a compiled component, such as AbiWord. On the one hand, the remote service 
makes some qualities easier to achieve (data sharing, backup, etc.), but on the other hand 
may make some qualities harder to achieve (data security over a network connection and in 
the “cloud,” up-time of the service, little or no control over when new versions of the service 
are used compared to complete control over when new versions of a component are 
integrated). 
 Who in the ecosystem of human actors for this system has the right to make the 
decisions to use a service in place of a component, or one component version in 
place of another? What obligations are they required to satisfy first? These 
questions are of concern at acquisition time and, we claim, are addressable by 
acquisition licenses that restrict rights and impose obligations important to 
system acquisition officers, just as IP licenses do for IP rights and obligations 
important to software producers. 
 When can these decisions be made? In traditional development processes, these 
would occur at design-time; but in the larger view we propound here, such 
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decisions, or rather the policies or acquisition licenses that control them, are 
perhaps more properly considered at acquisition time. As we see in Figure 7, it is 
also possible that in order to achieve specific security qualities, they might be 
made at build- or run-time, in response to specific threats. 
 
Figure 7. An End-User View of the Alternative Run-Time System Configuration 
Figure 7 shows a run-time view of this alternative configuration. To the end user, this 
system appears quite similar to the one in Figure 5, and the differences might scarcely be 
noticed, which raises the next set of possibilities. 
Both these instance architectures specify specific alternatives for the major 
components, for example, Firefox for the Web browser component. But which version of 
Firefox? For example, it is quite possible that both the instance architectures discussed 
above could be implemented using either Firefox 10 or Firefox 11, satisfying all the 
functional requirements with no change to the instance architecture and no revision of 
software shims. Who has the power to decide to use version 10 rather than version 11? 
How late in the software process can this decision be made? For example, could it be made 
as late as system startup time by a system user, in response to a particular security attack 
on the previous configuration? 
At the conceptually lowest level, the advent of code randomization and multi-variant 
software executables leads to the possibility of substituting essentially equivalent variants of 
the same component, most obviously at build-time. The decision to substitute one variant for 
another, or the decision to allow the substitution, can be made through the entire range of 
development times from acquisition time to run-time. The substitution can be put into effect 
by a human actor or by a software monitor following a security policy, either randomly or in 
response to specific events in the environment. 
Finally, an orthogonal consideration is the use of containment vessels to encapsulate 
components or subsystems within a virtual machine, to monitor and control interactions 
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among components and subsystems in order to block attacks and protect vulnerable parts 
of a system. Figure 8 shows a screenshot in ArchStudio of a design-time architecture 
utilizing eight containment vessels, seven for individual components and connectors and the 
eighth for the group of components and connectors associated with the OS. 
 
Figure 8. A Security Configuration Alternative for the Run-Time Configuration 
Instance That Encapsulates OA System Components and Connectors 
Within Different Virtual Machines (e.g., using the “Xen Hypervisor 
Project,” 2012) 
For security, the GPL’d Fedora can employ the SELinux capabilities to restrict all 
shell/operating systems commands through mandatory access control and type 
enforcement (see Figure 8), while other components can all be contained within one (for 
minimal security confinement) or more (for increased security confinement on a per 
component basis) Xen-based virtual machines (again, see Figure 8). The interoperability of 
SELinux and Xen is now a common feature of many large Linux system installations (e.g., 
Amazon.com now has more than 500K Linux systems running Xen; “SELinux on Xen,” 
2012; “Xen Hypervisor Project,” 2012). 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Our goal in this study was to develop and demonstrate a new approach to address 
challenges in the acquisition of secure OA software systems. Program managers, 
acquisition officers, and contract managers will increasingly be called on to provide review 
and approval of security measures that are employed during the design, implementation, 
and deployment of OA systems. We seek to make this a simpler and more transparent 
endeavor. This requires security policies that are appropriate for review and approval during 
acquisition by people who may not be expert in the specifics of how best to ensure that 
secure systems will result. Our view is to address this need by investigating how best to 
specify or model system security in ways that can accommodate security as a continuous 
process that must be supported throughout the system acquisition life-cycle for OA systems 
(Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008, 2011). 
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Our efforts reported here reveal that it is possible to employ a scheme through which 
complex OA systems can be designed, built, and deployed with alternative components and 
connectors into functionally similar system versions in ways that allow for overall system 
security through the use of multiple security mechanisms. We described a scheme for how 
to realize and specify such OA system configurations in ways that are inherently compatible 
with existing security mechanisms, and this scheme does not assume that individual system 
elements must be secure before inclusion into the secured system’s configuration. Central 
to our scheme is the incorporation of software product line concepts that are integrated with 
security mechanisms in a coherent way that is amenable to automated support and 
acquisition management. We also provided a case study that reveals where and how we 
specify a secure OA enterprise system product line in ways that can accommodate the 
diverse needs of software producers, software developers, system integrators, users, and 
acquisition managers. What remains as an important next step for this line of research effort 
is to more fully articulate how to simply and transparently specify OA system security using 
streamlined security policies using the kind of system security licenses we anticipate 
(Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2011), as well as designing and developing a prototype automated 
system that can support the modeling and analysis of OA system security policies, 
alternative version OA system configurations, and different OA security licenses. 
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